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The Return of Variable Obscenity?
By

FREDERICK F.

SCHAUER*

One of the more interesting developments in contemporary first
amendment doctrine has been the Supreme Court's gradual elimination
of the definitional approach to free speech cases. Under this approach,
certain classes of utterances, by definition, are wholly outside of the
meaning of the word "speech" as used in the first amendment, and may
thus be regulated by the state without regard for the higher standards
of justification normally imposed upon a state before it may regulate
speech. By focusing the inquiry at the definitional point, the Court
has, in these areas, avoided the necessity of evaluating the state's interest in regulating these utterances.
Recent cases, however, have demonstrated the Court's dissatisfaction with this approach. The entire category of libel was, at one
time, thought not to be speech at all, and therefore libelous utterances
were completely without any first amendment protection.' First for
public officials, 2 then for public figures generally,3 and finally to a
limited extent for private individuals,4 the Court has recognized that
even libelous statements may express ideas and thus are entitled to at
least some first amendment protection.5 As a result, libel is no longer
wholly excluded from the reach of the first amendment, and its characterization as "nonspeech"6 is no longer appropriate.' Similarly, commercial speech was once thought to be completely outside of the pro*
School.
1.
2.
379 U.S.
3.

A.B., 1967, M.B.A., 1968 Dartmouth College; J.D., 1972, Harvard Law
Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana,
64 (1964).
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Id.
6. This term comes from N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, I EMERSON,
HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 52 (4th ed.
4.
5.

1976).
7.

Id. at 657.
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tection of the first amendment,' but it is now recognized as speech of
some sort, requiring a much closer evaluation of the state's rationale
for its regulation. 9 Even "fighting words," which provided the first opportunity for the Court to enunciate the "nonspeech" doctrine," ' are
now entitled to some first amendment protection. 1 '
Until very recently, obscenity remained as the only area of strict
application of a definitional approach, with the Court generally adhering to the basic principles of Roth v. United States12 in holding obscenity to be completely without first amendment protection. 13 Yet the
decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,'14 upholding zoning
restrictions on sexually explicit materials which were not definitionally
obscene, may presage the demise of the definitional approach even for
obscenity. An exploration of this possibility and its ramifications is the
purpose of this article.
Young, however, does not represent the Court's first foray away
from the definitional approach in dealing with obscenity. In 1960,
Dean Lockhart and Professor McClure of the University of Minnesota
Law School advocated an approach known as "variable obscenity,"
under which the obscenity of the materials in question would be evaluated by looking to the context of their distribution and the state's interest in this particular form of regulation.1 5 This approach re8. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
See generally Redish, The First Amendment
in the Market Place: Commercial Speech and the Value of Free Expression, 39 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 429 (1971); Note, Commercial Speech-An End in Sight to Chrestensen,
23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1258 (1974).
9. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
10. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
11. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The Court has not expressly repudiated the fighting words doctrine, and the line between Cohen and Chaplinsky remains unclear. See, e.g., Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973); Lewis v.
City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972);
See generally Shea, "Don't Bother to
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
Smile When You Call Me That"-Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky.
L.J. 1 (1975).
However, the recent cases have made it clear that words must incite
or create a clear and present danger before they can be considered fighting words. Since
this degree of provocation would justify sanctions even if the words were speech, there
is thus no longer any doctrinal substance to the "nonspeech" approach. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919).
12. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
13. Id. at 481-85.
14. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
15. Lockhart and McClure did not actually create the concept of variable ob-
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presented a marked departure from the constant obscenity 6 approach
represented by Roth, and was very much in evidence in a number of
obscenity decisions of the 1960's. But by the 1970's the variable approach had become dormant, and it was not until Young that it reappeared. While a variable approach to the concept of obscenity may
be analytically sound, and while it may suggest possibilities for greater
personal freedom and more breathing room for first amendment values,
its actual application has in the past been just the opposite. Young
suggests that its reincarnation may have similar dangers, and it may
very well be that obscenity ought to remain as the last bastion of the
definitional approach to free speech.
The History of Variable Obscenity
7
The Concept Explained
The basic principle of variable obscenity is that the determination
of obscenity can only be made in the context of the material's distribution. This evaluation seems to involve three facets-the purpose of
the distributor, the manner of distribution, and to whom the material
is distributed.
The concept of variable obscenity first seemed to develop in the
context of the first facet, focusing on the motivation of the distributor
of the material. Thus, in Roth v. United States,'" Chief Justice Warren
expressed some dissatisfaction with the reasoning of the majority
opinion, since the conduct of the accused was not a factor in making
the determination of the degree of constitutional protection to be afforded:
scenity, but their 1960 article is the first clear explanation and theoretical justification
for the principle. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing ConstitutionalStandards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 68-88 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Censorship
of Obscenity]. See also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 938-39 (1963); Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 834 (1964); Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The
Core Constitutional Issue-What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1961); Lockhart
& McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN L. REv.
295 (1954).
16. Lockhart and McClure define the constant obscenity approach as one in which
the "material categorized as obscene is always obscene at all times and places and in
all circumstances . . . ." Censorship of Obscenity, supra note 15, at 68. In contrast,
the variable approach characterizes obscenity as "a chameleonic quality of material that
changes with time, place, and circumstance." Id.
17. The general description of the principles of variable obscenity contained here
is a synthesis of the ideas expressed by Lockhart and McClure and the other commentators whose works are cited in the previous footnote.
18. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person. The conduct of
the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or
picture. The nature of the materials is, of course, relevant as an
attribute of the defendant's conduct, but the materials are thus
placed in context from which they draw color and character. A
wholly different result might be reached in a different setting. 19
Thus, the concept of variable obscenity would recognize that the same
material might be distributed for different purposes. If the distributor
were attempting to convey an idea or create serious literature, then the
material would not be considered obscene. But if the distributor were
attempting solely to profit from human weakness for the sexually explicit, then the material could be considered obscene and the distributor
punished.
As a result, the idea of pandering is a central theme in the variable
obscenity principle. If material is distributed in such a way as to deliberately appeal to those whose only interest is in titillation, such as by
overly suggestive advertising, then the material, as so distributed, could
be deemed obscene, even though the material without the pandering
might not be. Under this approach, one looks to the motivation of
the individual who is doing the distributing, rather than solely to the
nature of material in the abstract.
The pandering concept also suggests the second facet of variable
obscenity: the manner in which the material is distributed. In addition
to pandering, this facet comes into play when there is an open or public
display of sexually explicit material. Thus, it has been suggested that a
public display of nudity would be obscene under the variable obscenity
principle, while the same picture when contained in a magazine or
shown in a theater would not be obscene. Here the manner of distribution becomes relevant because other significant governmental interests are implicated: the interest in protecting the unwilling viewer and
preservation of the quality or attractiveness of public areas.
The third facet of variable obscenity is the importance it places
on the intended and actual audience for the material.2" Again, the
19. Id. at 495 (Warren C.J., concurring). See also Kingsley Books, Inc., v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1957) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
20. In this aspect, variable obscenity may have originated with Regina v. Hicklin,

L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).

The test in that case, rejected in Roth, was that the material

at issue must be judged in part by determining "into whose hands a publication of this

sort may fall." Id. at 371.
In another case, materials which would otherwise have been deemed obscene were
held not to be obscene when imported solely for the purpose of scientific research.
United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see Note, The Law
of Obscenity: New Significance of the Receiving Group, 34 IND. L.J. 426 (1959); Note,

7 U. KANs. L. REv. 216 (1958).
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degree of public display becomes important. If the intended or actual
audience consists in part of unwilling viewers, then the state's interest
becomes greater, the freedom of choice interests become less, and the material could more easily, under a variable obscenity analysis, be deemed
obscene. Similarly, variable obscenity supports a more relaxed definition of what is obscene when the material is distributed to minors.
Since minors are likely to be more sexually immature, since the state's
general interest in the protection of minors is greater, and since the
concept of freedom of choice for minors is far less clear,2 ' a much more
inclusive concept of obscenity would be acceptable if the material is
available to minors. Finally, the proponents of variable obscenity
would discard the concept of the average person, looking instead to the
actual audience of the material in question. They argue that the average person test is directed to people whose sexual preferences are distinctly different from the average. Therefore, the effect on the actual
audience, not the effect on the hypothetical average person, is the
touchstone of the variable obscenity concept. As a result, seemingly
obscene material would not be deemed obscene under variable obscenity when the recipient was one whose interest in the material was scientific or literary, as opposed to prurient or sexually stimulating.
All these applications of the variable obscenity concept thus involve a significant contrast to the definitional or constant approach
exemplified by Roth. 2 First, the material must be looked at in context. The material itself can be neither obscene nor nonobscene. That
characteristic emerges only when the circumstances of actual distribution are taken into account. Therefore, the variable obscenity concept has little use for the formulations of constant obscenity, which require a determination of the average person or, perhaps, the hypothetical standards of the community. Second, variable obscenity requires
an evaluation of the state's interest and a balancing of the concerns of
the state against the values underlying the first amendment. Neither
21.

See generally Dibble, Obscenity: A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39

So. CAL. L. REv. 345 (1966); Note, Constitutional Problems in Obscenity Legislation
Protecting Children, 54 GEo. L.J. 1379 (1966); Note, "ForAdults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YALE L.J. 141

(1959).
22. See Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68 MICH.
L. REv. 185 (1969).
The drafters of the Model Penal Code elected to retain the constant obscenity approach while providing affirmative defenses for people having "scientific, educational,
governmental or other similar justification for possessing obscene material." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 251.4(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft, May 1962). See Schwartz,
Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 678-81 (1963).
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this balancing process nor, for that matter, any consideration of the
state's interest is a part of the Roth definitional approach.
The Concept Adopted
Although the Supreme Court continued to pay lip service to the
definitional approach throughout the 1960's its decisions show an increased adoption of the principles of variable obscenity.2" Thus, in
Jacobellis v. Ohio,2 4 Mr. Justice Brennan, the author of the plurality
opinion of the Court, stated that "the legitimate and indeed exigent interest of states and localities throughout the Nation in preventing the
dissemination of material deemed harmful to children. . . . does not
He then suggested
justify a total suppression of such material ..
that states enact laws specifically proscribing distribution of objectionable materials to children. Since the Court reversed the conviction in
Jacobellis, the clear implication is that the Court was ready to redefine
obscenity where minors were the receiving group. This changed definition is, of course, derived from the principle of variable obscenity,
and this indicated for the first time that the Court was willing to make
exceptions to the average person standard in Roth. This theme was
also joined by the Chief Justice, who reiterated the idea he had first
expressed in Roth that the circumstances of the distribution must be
considered:
In my opinion, the use to which various materials are put-not just
the words and pictures themselves-must be considered in determining whether or not the materials are obscene. A technical or
legal treatise on pornography may well be inoffensive under most
"obscene" in the extreme
circumstances but, at the same time,
20
when sold or displayed to children.
".."I'

The Chief Justice also suggested that where a film or other material
is specifically advertised in such a way as to suggest that it is pornographic, then this circumstance would be relevant in making the determination of obscenity.2 7 Thus, he presaged the Court's adoption of the
23. The history of the Court's acceptance of variable obscenity is traced in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590, 595-96 (5th Cir. 1966), vacated, 391
U.S. 53 (1968); cf. Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 196-97 &
n.17, 233 A.2d 840, 844-45 & n.17 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968); Monfred
v. State, 226 Md. 312, 323, 173 A.2d 173, 178 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953

(1962).
24.

378 U.S. 184 (1964).

25. Id. at 195.
26. Id. at 201 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 201 n.2.
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had also been explained in the writings of
"pandering" concept, which
28
Lockhart and McClure.
It was not until 1966, however, that the Court actually adopted
many of the concepts of the variable obscenity principle. Three cases
which were decided the same day all refer to or are based on the view
that obscenity cannot be defined in the abstract. In Memoirs v. Massachusetts,29 the Court suggested that in the close case, the circumstances of distribution might be important in determining obscenity.
Thus, if the material had the requisite prurient interest and patent offensiveness, but did have a minimum of redeeming social value, then
"the circumstances of production, sale and publicity are relevant in determining whether or not the publication or distribution of the book
is constitutionally protected."3 "
On the same day, the Court actually applied this theory in Ginzburg v. United States.3 ' The Court acknowledged that the magazine
Eros, taken in the abstract, might not be obscene and thus would be
protected by the first amendment.3" But the manner of the distribution
was not such as to accentuate the serious matter which was clearly contained in the publication.33 Rather, the advertising and distribution
was, in the Court's words, designed to appeal to "the leer of the sensualist."'34 The language of the opinion suggests that Ginzburg may
be little more than an estoppel case. 35 That is, if the defendant's words
and actions in connection with the promotion of the publication are
such as to specifically deny the existence of serious literary value, then
he will be estopped to claim such literary value when tried. But regardless of the conceptual basis for the opinion, Ginzburg, by specifically relying on the pandering theory, signaled the court's acceptance
of the concept of variable obscenity. The fact that Lockhart and
McClure were cited by some of the Justices in all three of the Court's
28. See note 15 supra.
29. 383 U.S. 412 (1966).
30. Id. at 420.
31. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). See Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127 (1966); Semonche, Delinnitional and Contextual Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13 U.C.LA. L. REV. 1173 (1966).

32. 383 U.S. at 465-66.
33. For example, there was evidence that Ginzburg had sought mailing privileges
in Intercourse and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania, and finally obtained mailing privileges in
Middlesex, New Jersey. Id. at 467-68.
34. See id. at 468.
35. See F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 83-84 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
SCrAUER].
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decisions that day leaves little doubt as to the seed for many of these
ideas. 6
37
The third case of the Memoirs trilogy is Mishkin v. New York.
Mishkin also referred to some of the pandering concepts explained in
Ginzburg,3 s but in light of the publications involved,39 it is doubtful that
in 1966 pandering was needed to justify the finding of obscenity. It
is unlikely that these publications, unlike Eros, could have been advertised or distributed in any other way. More significant is the fact that
the materials at issue in Mishkin were designed to appeal to those with
sexual preferences even more unusual than those of the average consumer of obscenity. These materials were directed at homosexuals and
sado-masochists, with the magazines' content emphasizing whips,
leather boots, chains, and the like. There is even some question as
to whether the average person concept is appropriate for determining
obscenity of the "normal" variety.4" It is clear that it would be useless
here, since these materials were not intended to and would not in fact
appeal to the prurient interest of the average person. This problem,
of course, exposed the basic weakness of the average person formulation, since it would be anomalous if a distributor of such materials could
escape prosecution and come within the reach of the first amendment
by making his wares even more offensive than that which would appeal
to the prurient interest of the average person.'
The Court handled
this problem by carving out a special category for material designed
to appeal to deviant groups. In these cases the average person concept
would be eliminated and in its place, the Court would substitute the
concept of the average member of that deviant group.4 2 Thus, the
Court recognized that in some instances obscenity would have to be
determined in relationship to the actual and intended recipients, another
concept borrowed from variable obscenity.
36. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 442 n.1 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 490 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
id. at 499-500 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 507

(1966).
37. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
38. Id. at 504-06.
39. The titles of the publications involved are listed in an appendix to the Court's
opinion. Id. at 514-15.
40. Many of the proponents of variable obscenity have argued that since obscenity
is not intended for the average person, it should not be defined in terms of the average
person. Compare Censorship of Obscenity, supra note 15, at 68-88 with Schwartz,
Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 678-81 (1963).
41. Cf. Elias, Obscenity: The Law, A Dissenting Voice, 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 1,
10 (1963).
42. 383 U.S. at 508-09.
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In 1968, the Court specifically held, following the suggestion in
Jacobellis, that where material was distributed to minors, the tests for
obscenity could be adjusted to take that fact into account. In fact,
Ginsberg v. New York 43 specifically acknowledged that it was affirming
New York's use of "variable concepts of obscenity"' 4" in allowing the
relaxed standard for defining obscenity authorized by the New York
statute. And in 1969, the Court handed down its decision in Stanley
v. Georgia," in which it refused to permit punishment for mere possession of admittedly obscene materials. Although the court did not
use the words "variable obscenity," that theory is nonetheless the basis
for the decision.46 Clearly the Court would not have reached a similar
conclusion if the prosecution had been for the purely private possession
of heroin or a sawed off shotgun. Thus it was the nature of the "contraband" together with the circumstances of the case that justified the
result in Stanley. Under a constant obscenity theory, the materials,
being obscene under the Roth-Memoirs test, would have been wholly
outside the scope of the first amendment and thus entitled to no greater
protection than the heroin or the sawed off shotgun. Therefore, what
the Court was really saying was that in this case, where the state interest was negligible, even hard core pornography was entitled to some
constitutional protection.47 This, then, is an application of the variable
obscenity theory no less than Ginsberg or Ginzburg, except that if is
applied to the exact opposite ends.
Finally, variable obscenity seems evident in the numerous "Red8
rup" reversals," the series of per curiam reversals of convictions
which involved neither juveniles, nor exposure to unwilling viewers,
nor pandering in the Ginzburg sense. Thus, the implication was that
the same material could be validly prosecuted under different circumstances.4 0
43. 390 U.S. 629 (1968); see Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children'sHour in Obscenity Litigation, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 153 (1968).
44. 390 U.S. at 635-37.
45. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
46. For an application of variable obscenity principles to private letters, see Ludwig, Private Correspondence Under the Mail Obscenity Law, 41 DENVER L.I. 152
(1964).
47. In addition to the free speech interest, the amorphous right to be free from
governmental intrusion was relied on heavily by the Court. See 394 U.S. at 564-65,
568.
48. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
49. Id. at 769.
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The Concept Rejected
The gradual adoption of the principles of variable obscenity by the
Warren Court was checked rather abruptly by the Burger Court. First,
there was the Court's refusal to extend the rationale of Stanley beyond
the somewhat unusual facts of that case. 5" More significant, however,
were the views expressed by the Chief Justice in Miller v. California5'
and the seven other cases decided at the same time.52- First of all, the
"hard core" requirement in Miller 3 for any determinations of obscenity
did not seem to leave much room for any variability. And in addressing himself to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, the Chief
Justice said: "Nor does [Mr. Justice Brennan] indicate where in the
Constitution he finds the authority to distinguish between a willing
'adult' one month past the state law age of majority and a willing 'juvenile' one month younger."'" Thus the Chief Justice called into question one of the most basic applications of the variable obscenity theory:
the modification of standards when allegedly obscene materials are distributed to juveniles. Furthermore, the conceptual justification for obscenity regulation which is contained in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton"5 is a strong reaffirmation of the basic holding of Roth that
material which is legally obscene is entitled to no constitutional protectection and that which is not legally obscene is entitled to all the protection of the first amendment. With the determination of obscenity
to be made in accordance with the Miller standards, and with no suggestion of any variation in the application of those standards, the concept of variable obscenity seemed destined to an early death. 56
50. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); United States v. ThirtySeven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
51. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
52. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973);
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); Heller v.New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973);
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 497 (1973); Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973)

(per curiam).
53. 413 U.S. at 24; see SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 109-13.
54. 413 U.S. at 27.
55. 413 U.S.49 (1973).
56. The Court, however, indicated its continuing adherence to the concepts of pandering and special standards for materials designed to appeal to a deviant group in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 128-30 (1974).
It is possible that the Court
was not prepared to reject all of the results of the variable obscenity principle. There
may, however, be other explanations for the Hamling opinion. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice
Relinquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REV. 293, 330-32 (1976).
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This prediction was evidenced in several subsequent decisions.
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,17 Mr. Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, observed that "we have not had occasion to decide what
effect Miller will have on the Ginsberg formulation." 58 But in addition
to questioning the continuing validity of varying the standard of obscenity where minors are concerned, the result in Erznoznik is itself a rejection of the variable obscenity theory. The issue in Erznoznik was
whether drive-in theatres showing sexually explicit motion pictures
could be required to build fences around those theatres in order to prevent observation by unwilling viewers and children. A variable obscenity approach might well have justified the restriction in that case, since
the result was less than total suppression and since the state interests
dealt with juveniles and passersby. But the Court refused to allow any
restriction at all. Relying on the equality principle, 50 the Court found
that since the material was not legally obscene within the Miller definition, it therefore could not be restricted in any way on the basis of
its content. Thus, Erznoznik is a reaffirmation of the "two-level"
theory60 which results from the definitional approach of Roth. If the
material is hard core pornography, it is entitled to no protection. If
it is not, it is entitled to complete protection. No variability is permitted depending on the state's interest or the type of recipient or the
nature of the regulation.
Similarly, the result in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad6 1
might also have been different under a variable obscenity approach.
Although the case was decided on procedural grounds, the true significance is its holding that the state must apply the same definition of
obscenity in denying permission for use of its own facilities for a performance as it does in penalizing conduct under its criminal laws.
Under an application of the principles of variable obscenity, the Court
might very well have said that the state's interest in controlling the use
of its own facilities was greater than its interest in regulating the conduct of others, thus allowing the state a greater degree of choice by
means of a relaxed definition of obscenity or by freedom to exclude
57. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
58. Id. at 213 n.10.
59. The equality principle holds that courts may not make or permit distinctions
based on the content of protected speech. The leading case before Erznoznik was Police
Department of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See generally Karst,
Equality as a Central Principlein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1976).
60. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv.
1, 10 (1960).
61. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
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that which is not obscene at all. However, the Court chose not to do
so, and its rejection of this approach was also a rejection of a variable
approach to the definition of obscenity.
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.:
The Return of Variable Obscenity?
The obscenity decisions of the Burger Court, particularly those
from Miller to Erznoznik, seemed to indicate a rejection of the variable
obscenity concept,6 2 a conclusion which I had made previously.63 But
the Court's decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.6" has
in dramatic fashion reversed this trend and rendered my prediction erroneous as to demise of variable obscenity. In Young, the Court permitted zoning restrictions on adult theatres and adult bookstores.
There had been no determination that the materials sold or exhibited
in these establishments were legally obscene under the Miller standards, nor did the Detroit ordinance at issue in Young require legal obscenity for its provisions to be applicable. 65 On its face, the case
seemed to be controlled by Erznoznik, since this was a regulation based
on content rather than on a finding of obscenity. But the Court, in
a decision written by Mr. Justice Stevens, virtually ignored Erznoznik
in upholding the Detroit regulation. The Court seems to have found
three factors to be significant. First, the city's interest in preserving
or improving the quality of its central business district was a valid, and
in fact admirable, governmental interest."
Second, the actual effect
on the distribution of this material was likely to be slight, since the
regulation did not purport to prohibit distribution.6" Finally, and most
significantly, the Court found that material which is sexually explicit and
is distributed solely for commercial reasons is entitled to less protection
than pure speech.68
62. The Court did indicate, however, that it might adjust the Miller test where live
conduct was at issue. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.. 546, 557-58
(1975); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.8 (1973); California v. La Rue, 409
U.S. 109 (1972). See generally SCHAUER, supra note 35, at 200-05.
63. SCHUAER, supra note 35, at 92-95.

64. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
65. The details of the ordinance and its definitions are contained in the Court's
opinion. Id. at 54.
66. Id. at 62-63, 71-72.
67. Id. at 62.
68. There is "a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is
on the border line between pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance .......
Id. at 61. "But few
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This last factor is clearly a weakening of the equality principle evidenced both by Erznoznik and Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley, 69 and in fact the Court acknowledged as much in saying that
the equality principle never was an absolute and should not be.7 ° In
so doing, the Court followed many of the precepts of variable obscenity
in reaching its result. Rejecting the constant obscenity approach, the
Court instead evaluated the state's interest in the regulation. 7 ' It also
looked to the method of distribution, which is reminiscent of the pandering concept in Ginzburg. And in holding that this type of speech
was entitled to less first amendment protection, the Court balanced
these factors against the justifications for the first amendment. Moreover, a new factor was added to the variable obscenity calculus: an
evaluation of the degree of regulation. In other words, a slight relaxation of the standards for determining obscenity is to be permitted where
there is no criminal sanction and the total dissemination of the materials was only incidentally affected.
It is this last and new factor which seems most significant. Many
recent decisions have indicated that noncriminal regulation of obscenity
is being attempted in many areas as an alternative or addition to traditional methods of criminal punishment for distributing obscene
materials.7 2 The Court has long acknowledged the propriety of such
alternate methods of regulation, leaving it to the states to develop the
means by which they will deal with material which is deemed to be
obscene.73 Young suggests that the Court may now permit such regulation of material which is not technically obscene under the Miller
standards, as long as it is sexually explicit and at least "close" to being
legally obscene. In these circumstances, the degree of regulation will
be weighed in the balance with the state's interest, the actual effect
on the total distribution of the materials, and the method of advertisement and promotion. By acknowledging that different standards may
be applied in different cases, and by recognizing that in these cases
the state's interest must be evaluated, the Court has taken a new step
of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to
see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Id. at 70.
69. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv.20 (1976).
70. 427 U.S. at 66.
71. See Loewy, A Better Test for Obscenity: Better for the States-Better for
Libertarians,28 HASTINGS L.J. 1315 (1977).
72. See Note, The Devil and the D.A.: Tie Civil Abatement of Obscenity, 28
HASTINGS LJ. 1329 (1977).
73. See, e.g., Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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towards a variable approach to defining obscenity. The effects of this
step, and the degree to which the Court is prepared to take more steps
in the same direction," remain to be seen.

The Hidden Dangers of Variable Obscenity
In an extremely perceptive observation, Professor Magrath has remarked that variable obscenity "is likely to read much better in legal
journals than it does in the United States Reports."7
It is true that
the variable obscenity theory is intellectually appealing. By acknowledging and evaluating all of the considerations involved, including the
state's interest, this approach brings obscenity into line with general
trends of first amendment analysis and brings out into the open the true
balancing of interests which is swept under the rug by the definitional
approach. Furthermore, variable obscenity has often been used as the
doctrinal support for those who would eliminate the regulation of obscenity as to "consenting adults." 76 But, with the exception of Stanley
v. Georgia,77 variable obscenity has more often been used to regulate
the dissemination of material which may in fact have some degree of
value.78 Ginzburg was the classic example in the 1960's, and Young
74. It should also be mentioned that Justice Stevens has put himself squarely in
the variable obscenity camp. See Marks v. United States, 45 U.S.L.W. 4233, 4235-36
(U.S., Mar. 1, 1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). Marks involved a post-Miller trial for
a pre-Miller offense. The majority rule that the due process clause of the fifth amendment precluded retroactive application of the Miller standards to the defendant in question. Justice Stevens, however, concurred in the result for radically different reasons.
Justice Stevens felt that the federal statute in question was constitutionally defective for
three reasons. First, it failed to recognize the first amendment protection that should
extend even to hard core pornography: "However distasteful these materials are to some
of us, they are nevertheless a form of communication and entertainment acceptable to
a substantial segment of society; otherwise, they would have no value in the market
place." Id. at 4236. Second, Justice Stevens felt it illogical for a statute to make criminal that which individuals have a right to possess under Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969). Third, Justice Stevens found the statute in question impermissibily vague.
In fact, he went on to remark, "my brief experience on the Court has persuaded me
that grossly disparate treatment of similar offenders is a characteristic of the criminal
enforcement of obscenity law." 45 U.S.L.W. at 4236.
75. Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7,
64. Professor Magrath also argues that this approach may have the effect of making
pornography accessible to the sophisticated but not to the unsophisticated. Id. at 66.
76. See, e.g., Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 938-39 (1963); Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity,

112 U.

PA. L. REV.

834 (1964).

77. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
78. This may explain why Dean Lockhart seems now to be less concerned with
variable obscenity. See Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex
and the First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533 (1975).
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may be the example for the 1970's. The real problem seems to be
that sexual explicitness cannot always be separated from either serious
literature or political argument. It is perhaps premature to predict
that Young may be read to permit some regulation of the works of
Henry Miller or D.H. Lawrence; this "parade of horribles" argument
seems tiresome even to those of us who have used it.79 But the necessary implication of Young is that now the states are permitted to regulate material which has the requisite degree of serious political, artistic,
literary, or scientific value, or which does not appeal to the prurient
interest, or which is not patently offensive. It is, of course, the first
of these propositions that is most disturbing. But if this interpretation
of Young's implication is not correct, then why was not the Young
ruling limited to the legally obscene? History has shown that lower
courts often have great difficulty in interpreting what the Supreme
Court thinks is a clear definition of obscenity. Errors of this sort seem
even more likely to occur when the lower courts must determine what
is "almost obscene."
The dangers seem more apparent in the case of the underground
newspaper. It cannot be denied that the underground newspaper is
a form of political expression in modem society, a vehicle for the expression of ideas not often found in the more conventional media.
Moreover, and most important, the expression often is made in sexual
terms. The Supreme Court has indicated that ideas are nonetheless
being expressed, and such publications may not in general be branded
as obscene."' But if the places in which such publications may be sold
or the manner in which such expression may be made is subject to some
regulation because of its explicitness, then one cannot be sure of the
effect such restrictions will have on the ability of people such as Kois s '
and Cohen"2 to express their views.
What, then, of the bookstore which sells mainly adult magazines,
but sells also underground newspapers, Playboy, Lady Chatterly's
Lover, and The Joy of Sex? Young does not require that the establishments within its reach deal exclusively in the types of material described by the ordinance, but requires only that such materials predom79.

See Schauer, Obscenity: After Young, Which Way the Trend?, VA. L.

WEEKLY, October 8, 1976.

80. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972). See also Dillingham v. State, 9 Md.
App. 669, 267 A.2d 777 (1970).
81. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) (underground newspaper).
82. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (wearing of a jacket bearing the
words "Fuck the Draft" is constitutionally protected).
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inate.88 While there may not result the complete elimination of the
type of publications I have just mentioned, I am disturbed that there
might be any effect at all, since such materials are clearly the source
of ideas for many people in our society.
Similarly, what if a broadened application of the nuisance theory
is used to increase the possibility of prior restraints? The propriety of
such a theory has been frequently before the courts, and the prevailing
view has been that theaters and bookstores cannot be completely
closed down because of what they might have sold or shown in the
past. 84 But if Young stands for the proposition that greater restrictions
are possible when the method of regulation is something other than
criminal penalties, the possibility of more theater or bookstore closings
cannot be considered remote.
What I am suggesting can be taken as a criticism of any balancing
approach in any area, and it can be said that these dangers will not
become real "while this Court sits."8 5 But the history of obscenity
regulation is unique, both in terms of what the Supreme Court has done
and in terms of how the lower courts have interpreted its mandates.
While I am in general pleased with the Burger Court's rejection of
a definitional approach on other areas of first amendment doctrine, I
feel troubled by this change in approach in the obscenity area, both
because of the practical dangers I have outlined and because of its concomitant weakening of the equality principle which seems at the core
of the first amendment. The Young approach involves an evaluation
of the importance of speech which seems no less harmful than judicial
evaluations of the truth of speech.
Conclusion
At bottom, variable obscenity is a balancing approach, and we
83. The ordinance at issue in Young defined adult book stores as those in which
such publications were a "substautial or significant portion of its stock in trade." 427
U.S. at 53-54 n.5. Even a store with "a segment or section" devoted to adult material
is covered. Id. The definition of an adult theater does not contain any requirement
of "substantiality." Id.
84. This was the issue before the Supreme Court in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975), but the Court directed abstention and thus did not reach the merits.
Many lower courts have reached decisions on the merits. See, e.g., Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 43-44 (S.D. Texas 1975) (3-judge ct.); Sanders
v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974). See generally Note, Restricting the Public
Display of Offensive Materials: The Use and Effectiveness of Public and Private Nuisance Actions, 10 U.S.F. L. Rav. 232 (1975).
85. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissent-

ing).
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must recognize that this balancing will take place at all levels of the
judicial process. By reviving the concept of variable obscenity, the Supreme Court has also revived some of the dangers of the balancing approach in the first amendment area, dangers which have traditionally
been most apparent with regard to obscenity. The Roth-Miller approach seems to have two somewhat related advantages. First, it
seems to have worked, at least as recently applied. By this I mean
that in general the Miller formula has resulted in prosecutions and convictions almost exclusively of true hardcore pornography, with few of
the embarrassing exceptions of earlier eras. The persistence of obscenity regulation in some form seems inevitable, and thus the main
problem is the separation of the obscene from that which ought be protected. The Miller approach has performed this separating function
tolerably well, and I am not sure that a variable approach will be as
able to perform this function of separation, either conceptually or practically.
Second, the constant obscenity approach has the effect of telling
the states that there is a certain area which is clearly out of bounds
for any form of regulation. If there is no such clearly defined area
into which the states are absolutely forbidden to enter, the scope of
the regulation which results may very well encroach on the values
which lie at the core of the first amendment. While there may be some
conceptual weaknesses in the constant approach, a look at the record
should convince us that it works better than any other approach to the
problem used in the past.

